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should also have the contractual statute of limitations applied because no
fault need be proved there either. This application of the contractual
statute of limitations was repeated for the same reasons by a Pennsylvania
district court.54
The Le Gate case did not decide that the unseaworthiness action was
of a contractual nature thus departing from the Sieracki decision, but
rather that the contractual statute of limitations was better suited to the
action of unseaworthiness than the delictual statute. This could well prove
to be something of a compromise answer to the question of whether the
unseaworthiness has a delictual or contractual nature or perhaps neither
as maintained by Sieracki.
In conclusion, the doctrine of laches determines how long a libellant
may wait to bring his action in admiralty. In the absence of a statutory
provision setting out this time as in the Jones Act, or special circumstances
contracting or expanding the period during which an action may be
brought without prejudicing the respondent, the applicable state statute
of limitations is used as a guide to the proper period. The contractual
statute is consistently used in maintenance and cure actions. The majority
of courts apply a delictual statute in actions for unseaworthiness but a
possible trend, originated by the second circuit, towards applying a con-
tractual statute is discernible.
54 Cummings v. Redeeriakteeb Transatlantic, 144 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa., 1956), aff'd.
242 F.2d 275 (C.A.3rd, 1957).
DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHTS AGAINST NEGLIGENT
THIRD PARTIES UNDER THE ILLINOIS WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
The Workmen's Compensation Act when introduced was a revolution-
ary development in the solution to the problem of industrial accidents.
From the date of its mental conception to the time of its legal inception
this legislation has given rise to repeated queries from the members of the
Illinois Bar. In April of 1911, John H. Wigmore assailed the adoption of
this legislation in Illinois at that time. In discussing its complexities and
lack of national uniformity he said: "The danger is-yes, the certainty is
-that confusion will be 'worse confounded' if these bills pass now."'
Although fifty years have passed, many provisions of this legislation
still appear to be in a state of legal confusion. This article will be limited
to just one of these areas of confusion-third party liabilities. The discus-
sion is made in the hope that a disentanglement of past judicial decisions
will lead to a clearer understanding and appreciation of the 1959 Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act.
15 11. L. Rev. 571 (1911).
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ORIGIN OF THE ACT
It may be wise to begin with a general discussion of the rights of em-
ployees who are injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of
their employment. To facilitate the reader comprehension of this, an ex-
amination of the rights and liabilities of all parties who may be involved
in industrial accidents must be made.
Prior to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employee's common
law action for negligence against his employer was almost always de-
feated by the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence or
the Fellow-Servant Rule.2 In contrast to this, the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act provided a pattern of compensation for employees
who had sustained injury arising out of and in the course of their em-
ployment. This plan entitled the employee to a pre-established sum irre-
spective of common law liability factors such as his employer's negligence
or his own contributory negligence, assumption of risk or the Fellow-
Servant Rule.8
This remedy was not an augmentation of the employee's common law
rights but rather one given in substitution for them.4 In Nordland v. St.
Francis Hospital," the plaintiff was an intern in the defendant's hospital.
During the course of his employment while assisting an operation the
anesthetic machine exploded and injured the plaintiff. He brought a com-
mon law action for negligence against the hospital. The court held that
they had no jurisdiction over the case and based their decision on the case
of Thorton v. Herman.6 In the Thorton case the court held that the
Workmen's Compensation Act had abolished the employee's common
law action against his employer.
To be sure, the destruction of the employee's ineffectual common law
remedy against his employer was, in fact, no loss to the employee. In its
stead he received the absolute right of recovery for certain specified in-
juries that arose out of and during the course of his employment.7 The
employee was thereby assured of immediate and certain relief without
the necessity of costly, tedious and dubious litigation.8
2 Angerstein, Illinois Workmen's Compensation § 14 (1952).
3il1. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48, 99 138.7, 138.8.
4 11. Rev. Stat. (1913), c. 48 § 143 provides: "No common law or statutory right to
recover damages for injury or death sustained by any employe while engaged in the
line of his duty as such employe, other than the compensation herein, provided, shall be
available to any employe who is covered by the provisions of this act. .. "
4 I11. App.2d 48, 123 N.E.2d 121 (1954); Hayes v. Marshall Field & Co., 351 111. App.
329, 115 N.E.2d 99 (1953).
6380 Ill. 341, 43 N.E.2d 934 (1942).
7 I11. Rev. Star. (1951) c. 48, §§ 138.7, 138.8; Moushon v. National Garages, 9 Ill.2d
407, 137 N.E.2d 842 (1956).
8 Consult 11. Bar. J., Vol. 45.7, p. 440 (1957).
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The scope of this new system of compensation was not limited to the
master-servant relationship. It extended to and included third persons and
their rights and liabilities to the injured employee and his employer. This
understanding was provided for by the provisions of Section 29 of the
1913 Act and this language was substantially reproduced in paragraphs
one and two of Section Five of the 1951 enactment.9
EARLY PROCEDURE
The statute, as originally enacted, was elective in that both the em-
ployer and the employee had the right to elect to be bound by the Act.
In fact, the Act's constitutionality was first upheld on the grounds that it
was elective and not compulsory. 10
Section 29 of the Act divided the employers and employees who had
voluntarily become bound by the provisions of the Act from employers
and employees who had not become bound by the Act. It established the
0 fI1. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 48 S 138.5 which provides:
[1] "Where an injury or death for which compensation is payable by the employer
under this Act was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer or his
employees, and was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages
in some person other than the employer to pay damages,... such other person having
also elected to be bound by this Act, or being bound thereby under Section (3) of this
Act, then the right of the employee or personal representative to recover against such
other person shall be transferred to his employer and such employer may bring legal
proceedings against such other person to recover the damages sustained, in an amount
not exceeding the aggregate amount of compensation payable under this Act, by reason
of the injury or death of such employee.
[2] "Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act
was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees and
was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the part of
some person other than the employer to pay damages, such other person having elected
not to be bound by this Act, then legal proceedings may be taken against such other
person to recover damages notwithstanding such employer's payment of or liability
to pay compensation under this Act. In such case, however, if the action against such
other person is brought by the injured employee or his personal representative and
judgment is obtained and paid, or settlement is made with such other person, either with
or without suit, then from the amount received by such employee or personal repre-
sentative there shall be paid to the employer the amount of compensation paid or to be
paid by him to such employee or personal representative.
[5] "In the event the said employee or his personal representative shall fail to institute
a proceeding against such third person at any time prior to 3 months before said action
would be barred at law said employer may in his own name, or in the name of the em-
ployee, or his personal representative, commence a proceeding against such other person
for the recovery of damages on account of such injury or death to the employee, and
out of any amount recovered the employer shall pay over to the injured employee or
his personal representative all sums collected from such other person by judgment or
otherwise in excess of the amount of such compensation paid or to be paid under this
Act, and costs, attorney's fees and reasonable expenses as may be incurred by such em-
ployer in making such collection or in enforcing such liability." Paragraph five of this
section was added by amendment: 111. Rev. Stat. (1935) c. 48, § 166.
10 Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 I11. 11, 113 N.E. 173 (1916).
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respective rights and liabilities of all employers and employees covered
under the Act against third parties who had not become bound by the
Act.
As originally enacted, Section 29 of the Illinois Workmen's Compen-
sation Act consisted of two unnumbered paragraphs." The first para-
graph dealt with situations where the injured employee and his employer
were bound by the Act and established their respective rights against the
third party tortfeasors who were also voluntarily bound by the Work-
men's Compensation program. Paragraph One provided:
Where an injury or death for which compensation is payable by the employer
under this Act was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer
or his employees, and was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability
for damages in some person other than the employer to pay damages, such
other person having also elected to be bound by this Act ... then the right of
the employee or personal representative to recover against such other person
shall be transferred to his employer and such . . . other person to recover the
damages sustained, in an amount not exceeding the aggregate amount of com-
pensation payable under this Act, by reason of the injury or death of such
employee.' 2
In this situation the employer was subrogated to the rights of the injured
employee provided that the injury, "was not proximately caused by the
negligence of the employer or his employees." The employer and not the
injured employee was given the right to sue the negligent third person.
The employer could recover an amount not in excess of that for which he
was liable to the employee under the Act. This subrogation right was
qualified in that the employee's injury must have been incurred during
the course of the employee's employment and arising out of his employ-
ment.
The legislative purpose in enacting this provision was to provide added
inducement to employers to voluntarily be bound by the Act. In so doing
they would acquire immunity from common law negligence actions
brought by third parties who were bound by this statute. The non-negli-
gent employer was herein subrogated to the rights that the injured em-
ployee would have had against the third party tortfeasors. Thus, the para-
mount objective of this provision was the protection of the employer's
rights. In a comprehensive treatise on Illinois Workmen's Compensation,
Mr. T. C. Angerstein concluded that the essential purpose of paragraph
one was the providing for indemnification of the employer for compen-
sation paid out under the Act.'3
The second paragraph of Section 29 dealt with the employer's and em-
"Ill. Rev. Stat. (1913) c. 48, S 166.
12 Ibid.
13 Angerstein, Illinois Workmen's Compensation § 997 (1952).
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ployee's rights against a negligent third person who was not bound by
the Act.14 It provided the injured employee with an action against the
negligent third person for damages notwithstanding the fact that the em-
ployer paid this injured employee under Workmen's Compensation. In
such a situation it further provided that the injured employee must reim-
burse his employer out of his recovery. This reimbursement was limited
to the amount that the employer had paid to the injured employee under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. This right of the employer to indem-
nification was likewise restricted as it had been in paragraph one of this
section. The identical words of paragraph one, "was not proximately
caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees," also ap-
peared as a limitation herein on the employer's right to indemnification. 15
The analysis of paragraph two of Section 29 as explained is based upon
a reading of the section as a whole. Paragraph two if taken out of context
of the section would result in an entirely different interpretation.
On its face, the phrase "was not proximately caused by the negligence
of the employer or his employees" could logically be construed only to
mean that the employee's right to recover for his injuries is subject to
the condition precedent established by this phrase. The net result would be
that in an action against a third party tortfeasor the employee's recovery
would be defeated if either his employer or his fellow employee was
negligent.
The phraseology of paragraph two when interpreted by itself leads to
this inescapable result. However, as pointed out previously, the opposite
construction is to be preferred when the section is read in its entirety.
This latter interpretation has also received the sanction of the Illinois Su-
preme Court as shall be pointed out later in this discussion.
In 1917 a compulsory amendment was enacted. 16 This amendment pro-
vided that the Act would automatically apply to all employers and their
employees who were engaged in extrahazardous activities. 17 This amend-
ment enlarged the application of paragraph one of Section 29. As origi-
nally enacted this paragraph dealt only with people who had voluntarily
become bound or who had refused to be bound by the Act. The net re-
sult was that the injured employee covered by the Act lost his cause of
action against the negligent third party who now became covered auto-
matically by the Act. However, the employer of the injured employee
1411!. Rev. Star. (1913) c. 48, § 166.
15 Ibid.
16 111. Rev. Stat. (1917) c. 48, S 139.
17 Ibid. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co. v. Industrial Comm., 299 111. 189, 132 N.E.
511 (1921). The constitutionality of this compulsory amendment was upheld as a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.
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had an action against this third party who had automatically become
bound by the Act. The employer's recovery was limited to the amount of
money paid out to the injured employee under the Act.
In the landmark case, O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry., is the Illinois Su-
preme Court rendered the first decision which provided a comprehensive
analysis of Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the
O'Brien case an action was brought to recover damages for injuries suf-
fered by the plaintiff-employee. The plaintiff had been employed by the
City of Chicago and while engaged in his work on the street was struck
and injured by a streetcar operated by the Chicago City Ry. Company,
a third party not bound by the Act. The plaintiff in his complaint failed
to allege his employer's freedom from contributory negligence. The de-
fendant contended that plaintiff's right to recover was thereby defeated.
Thus the construction of paragraph two of Section 29 was squarely
placed before the Illinois Supreme Court. In granting judgment for the
plaintiff, the court ruled that the plaintiff-employee was not required to
allege his employer's freedom from negligence in an action against a third
party.
The court held that the phrase in paragraph two, "was not proximately
caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees" was a limita-
tion on the employer's right of subrogation and not a qualification on the
employee's rights against negligent third parties. It was concluded that
the employee's rights against third parties were based on a common law
action for negligence. The court went on to say that the contributory
negligence of the employer was not a defense to a common law action
brought by an employee against a third party. This interpretation has
been buttressed and reaffirmed by successive decisions. 19
In 1935 paragraph two of Section 29 was augmented and clarified by
amendment. 20 The amendment provided the non-negligent employer with
a lien upon any recovery of his employee from the negligent third party.
The lien thereby enabled the non-negligent employer to recover the
amount of compensation payments he had made to the injured employee.
It further provided that under certain circumstances the non-negligent
employer could bring an action in his own name or in the name of his
injured employee against the negligent third party. In such a situation the
employer was required to pay the employee all sums collected in excess
18 305 Ill. 244, 137 N.E. 214 (1922).
19 Ketler Co. v. Industrial Comm., 392 Ill. 564, 65 N.E. 359 (1946); Huntoon v. Pritch-
ard, 371 I11. 36, 20 N.E.2d 53 (1939); O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry., 305 Ill. 244, 137 N.E.
314 (1922); Hulke v. International Mfg. Co., 14 Ill. App.2d 5, 142 N,E,2d 717 (1957);
Dillon v. Nathan, 10 Ill. App.2d 289, 135 N.E.2d 136 (1956).
20 Ill. Rev. Star. (1935) c. 48, 5 166.
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of litigation expenses thereby incurred and compensation payments paid
to the employee.
The legislature in enacting this amendment reinforced and clarified the
original purpose of paragraph two of Section 29. They established a
means of reimbursing a non-negligent employer for compensation pay-
ments made to an employee, necessitated by the intervening negligence of
a third party.
THE IMPACT OF THE GRASSE CASE
Section 29, as enacted in 1913, with the exception of two minor amend-
ments in 1917 and 1935 remained in its original form until 1952. In 1952
the Illinois Supreme Court held paragraph one of Section 29 unconstitu-
tional in Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co. 21 It was decided that this para-
graph wrongfully deprived employees of their common law tort action
against third parties who were bound by the Act, either by compulsion
22
or election2 3 by transferring the employee's cause of action to their em-
ployer. The court reasoned that since the employee under paragraph two
of this section retained his rights against third parties not bound by the
Act, the denial of the same right under paragraph one was unreasonable
and arbitrary.
In holding paragraph one of Section 29 unconstitutional, the Illinois
Supreme Court created a problem. This problem was, what were the
rights of an employee against a third person who was bound by the Act?
The court answered this question by saying that the effect of their deter-
mination in holding paragraph one unconstitutional was to restore to the
employee the same rights he had against a negligent third party prior to
the enactment of paragraph one.
The legislature, following the decision in the Grasse case deleted para-
graph one from Section 29 and adopted verbatim paragraph two of the
1951 Act.24 In 1951 Section 29 was numerically redesignated to be Sec-
tion 5 and shall be referred to as such in the subsequent discussion. The
net result of the 1953 Act was that in an action by an employee against a
third party it became immaterial whether the third party was under the
Act or not. In either situation, the employee had an unimpaired common
law right of action against the negligent third party.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Forty-six years have elapsed since the introduction of these Workmen's
Compensation laws to this state. During this time Section Five has proved
to be a fertile source of litigation. Interpretational conflicts reached an
21412 111. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952). 23 Ibid., § 138.2.
22 1. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 48, § 138.3. 24 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 48, § 138.5.
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apex in Rylander v. Chicago Short Line Ry. 25 Justice Shaefer, stating the
opinion of the court, said:
We allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal, primarily to re-
examine the effect of the Workmen's Compensation Act upon a common-law
action for negligence brought by an employee injured in the course of his em-
ployment by someone other than his employer. 26
The court's re-examination revealed a continuity of judicial expression on
this issue. Notwithstanding this uniformity there also appeared an equally
persistent effort on the part of many members of the Bar to construe Sec-
tion Five of the Act to the contrary. It is believed that the court's interest
was not in reviewing the effect of Section Five but in the reassertion in
unequivocal language the correct construction to be given to the section.
In the Rylander case an action was brought by an employee to recover
damages for injuries suffered due to the negligence of the defendant, a
third party non-employer. In sustaining the plaintiff's action, the Illinois
Supreme Court denied the construction of Section Five (b) of the Work-
men's Compensation Act as advanced by the defendant.27 The defendant
asserted that this Section should be construed so as to require the plain-
tiff-employee to plead and prove his employer's freedom from contribu-
tory negligence. He contended that it was a condition precedent to re-
covery in a common law negligence action against a third party non-
employer. It may be noted at this point that this proposed construction
had been urged in a previous case and met with similar rejection by the
court.
28
In the instant case, Rylander was an employee of the Interlake Iron
Company. On February 19, 1951, Rylander, while on Interlake's property
and in the course of his employment, was fastening the cover on a tank
car which had been delivered to Interlake by the defendant. The fasten-
ing device on the tank car cover was defective. This situation was the re-
sult of the defendant's negligence in failing to discover and repair this
condition. In attempting to fasten this cover plate the plaintiff was re-
quired to apply an unusual amount of force to tighten the cover and, as a
result, lost his balance, fell and sustained severe injuries.
Once again the problem of the rights of the injured employee against a
third person under Section Five were placed at issue before the Illinois
Supreme Court. In construing Section Five the court took cognizance of
the unconstitutionality of the first provision of Section Five even though
the Grasse case was decided after the Rylander action arose. It is there-
25 17 Il1. 2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812 (1959).
26 Ibid., at 813 (emphasis supplied).
27 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 48, § 138.5.
28 O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry., 305 11. 244, 137 N.E. 214 (1922).
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fore evident that the only valid statutory provision dealing with employee
rights in a third party proceeding was paragraph two of Section Five.
Paragraph two dealt with the rights of the employee against a third party
tortfeasor who was not bound by the Act. It provided that an employee
could bring a common law action for negligence against a third party
tortfeasor. There was no provision in paragraph two for the transfer of
the employee's cause of action to his employer as had been previously
found in paragraph one of the section. Paragraph two did provide for the
employer to recover any amounts paid to the employee under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. However, this reimbursement was limited to
certain circumstances.
The employer was permitted this recovery only when the accident
"was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer or his
employees. ' 29 The Illinois Supreme Court again took the position that the
phrase was intended for the protection and reimbursement of the non-
negligent employer. They once again denied the argument that under the
Act the employee is without a remedy against a third party if his em-
ployer is contributorily negligent.30 The court held that this phrase was
not a qualification of the employee's rights against third parties but rather
a limitation on the employer's right to subrogation.
Shortly before the Rylander decision, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit construed Section 5(b) of the Illinois Com-
pensation Act.81 This case similarly involved an action by employee
against a third party. This court also held that Section 5 (b) did not have
the effect of requiring the employee to prove his employer's freedom
from contributory negligence in a third party proceeding.
This discussion has been limited to an examination of respective rights
of the employer and his employee against a negligent third person. How-
ever, it has become necessary to briefly discuss the problem of the rights
and liabilities of fellow employees.
In a recent case, O'Brien v. Rautenbush,32 the problem of the liabilities
of a fellow employee was raised. In this case the plaintiff was injured in
an automobile accident as a result of his fellow employee's negligence.
The court refused to grant the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. Their
refusal was based upon the phrase in Section 5(b) that the injury "was
not proximately caused by the employer or his employees." Complete
29111. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 48, S 166.
80 Hulke v. International Mfg. Co., 14 Ill. App. 2d 5, 142 N.E.2d 717 (1957).
81 Giguere v. U.S. Steel, 262 F.2d 189 (C.A.7th, 1959).
82 10 ll.2d 167, 139 N.E.2d 222 (1956); Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 I11. App. 150
(1930). While an employee's action against a fellow servant is not specifically barred
in Section 5 the cases have held that the injury arises out of and in the course of their
employment an action against a fellow employee is barred.
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immunity was thereby granted to a fellow employee from a common law
action brought by a fellow servant.
The court's reliance on this phrase in denying liability is incongruous
with prior decisions. Previously, the phrase has been held to apply only
to the rights of the employer to subrogation. Yet in Rautenbush, it was
the basis for denying the recovery of the plaintiff employee. In the Ry-
lander case the court recognized this irregularity and conceded that this
construction of Section 5(b) was erroneous. They further commented,
without reference to any specific section, that the Act does prohibit a
common law action for negligence between employees. It must be noted
that the Rautenbush case involved an action between employees and not
a third party tortfeasor. In the light of this factual distinction the case
cannot be said to have altered the construction of Section 5(b) as inter-
preted by the Rylander case.
CONCLUSION
Section Five from the date of its inception to the present time has not
been clearly understood by the members of the Bar of this state. In spite
of this lack of understanding it is submitted that the Illinois Supreme
Court has maintained a uniform position in the interpretation of the
phrase "was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer
or his employee." The court's view that the phrase is a limitation upon the
employer's right to subrogation becomes an inescapable conclusion when
viewed in light of past judicial decisions and a reading of Section Five in
its entirety.
Assume a hypothetical situation where the employee is injured by the
negligence of a third party and the employee's employer is also negligent.
Using the Illinois Supreme Court's construction of the phrase, the em-
ployee could recover under the Act from his employer and also from the
third party pursuant to Section 5(b). However, the employer because of
his own negligence would not be able to recover the amount of compen-
sation payments paid to his employee. The result would be that the em-
ployee would be the recipient of a "double recovery."
However, in the case of negligence on the part of the employer and the
third party, the employee is placed in the position of a person who has
been injured by two different people. The employee's compensation claim
against his employer is in the nature of an ex contractu action. In regards
to the employee's rights against the third party, it is based upon an ex de-
licto action. Most assuredly the employee in this situation has not received
a "windfall." Instead, he is a person who is in possession of two separate
and distinct causes of action which he should be allowed to enforce.
Surely this result is morally and legally acceptable and as such poses no
problem to the acceptance of the court's construction of this phrase.
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The great import of the Rylander case is not found in the definitive
words of the court but rather the impetus it provided the state legisla-
ture. After forty-six years of existence the phrase "was not proximately
caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees" was omitted
in the 1959 statute.33 The section was not otherwise changed. This legis-
lative action is in complete accord with the previous decisions of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court. The question is now absolutely resolved.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 48, S 138.5(b).
THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
A JUDICIAL REPEAL
INTRODUCTION
Section 1983' and Section 19852 of the Civil Rights Act were originally
enacted in 1871.8 In the years following, they have been the subject of a
great amount of discussion.4 They have been called "a powerful piece of
legislation,"'5 however, recent decisions involving law enforcement offi-
cials have tended to repeal any powerful effect they may have had.
Section 1983 gives a cause of action for denial of due process6 while
142 U.S.C.A. 1 1983 (Supp., 1959) provides: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, sut
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
242 U.S.C.A. 1 1985 (Supp., 1959) provides: "(3) If two or more persons in any
State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of
another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authori-
ties of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State
or Territory the equal protection ofthe laws; ... in any case of conspiracy set forth
in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for
the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.
8 17 Stat. 13 (1871), "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
4 Consult: Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L.
Rev. 1323 (1952).
5 Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (CA. 3rd, 1950).
6Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (C.A.7th, 1954), cert. den. 349 US. 940 (1955);
McShone v. Moldovan, 172 F2d 1016 (C.A.6th, 1949); Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d
705 (C.A.10th, 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 944 (1948).
